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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Vaughn contends that the district court erred when it determined his statements made
prior to receiving Miranda1 warnings were admissible during his jury trial. Despite the fact that
the district court actually ruled on the merits of the Miranda issue after hearing arguments from
both parties, the State now argues that the Miranda issue is being raised for the first time on
appeal. That sort of argument has actually been rejected by the Court of Appeals. The State’s
arguments on the merits of the Miranda issue are similarly unpersuasive.
Since the totality of the circumstances reveals that a reasonable person in Mr. Vaughn’s
situation would not have believed he was free to go, Mr. Vaughn’s unwarned statements during
that time were elicited while he was in custody. Since that issue was sufficiently preserved
below, this Court should reverse the decision to admit those unwarned statements, vacate the
judgment of conviction, and remand this case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Vaughn’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred when it concluded Mr. Vaughn was not in custody for Miranda
purposes during the pretext traffic stop.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Concluded Mr. Vaughn Was Not In Custody For Miranda
Purposes During The Pretext Traffic Stop

A.

The Miranda Issue Was Sufficiently Preserved For Appeal By The District Court’s
Ruling On The Merits Of That Issue After It Heard Arguments From Both Parties
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Vaughn explained that the Miranda issue was properly

raised on appeal because the district court had implicitly rejected the prosecutor’s argument
under I.C.R. 12 by ruling on the merits of Mr. Vaughn’s argument. (App. Br., p.6 (citing State v.
DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998); State v. Beck, 157 Idaho 402, 405 (Ct. App. 2014);
State v. Middleton, 114 Idaho 377, 380 (Ct. App. 1988).) The State does not challenge the
propriety of the district court’s decision to reject the I.C.R. 12 argument. (See generally Resp.
Br.) Rather, its only response is that, because the parties and the district court had discussed the
implications of I.C.R. 12’s timing rules, the Miranda issue had not actually been argued or ruled
on below, and therefore, that issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal under State v.
Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 396 P.3d 700 (2017). (Resp. Br., pp.6-11; e.g., Resp. Br., p.9
(arguing that when, in response to the prosecutor’s question about the I.C.R. 12 argument, the
district court clarified its preference was for such motions to be brought earlier, the district court
was “making it even more apparent that it was not ruling on an eleventh-hour motion to
suppress”).)
The Court of Appeals has already rejected a remarkably-similar argument because it
“oversimplifies” what happened below. See State v. Dice, 126 Idaho 595, 598 (Ct. App. 1994).
The Dice Court explained that, despite the prosecutor’s argument under I.C.R. 12, the
suppression issue in that case still had, in fact, been raised below because the parties had argued,
and the district court had ruled on, the merits of that issue. Id. As the Idaho Supreme Court has
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succinctly summarized, where the specifics of such issues have been argued to, and, “in essence”
ruled on by the district court, the appellate court is able to address them on appeal.
Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351, 357 (1990); accord DuValt, 131 Idaho at 553; see
Dice, 126 Idaho at 598 (proceeding to evaluate both the I.C.R. 12 and the merits arguments on
appeal). 2
The record in this case makes it clear that, like in Northcutt, the specifics of the Miranda
issue were actually argued to, and ruled on by, the district court. Defense counsel explained that
his client had just brought an issue regarding a violation of Miranda’s protections during the
roadside detention to his attention – that “there was no rights given at that stage. I do know that
he was in police custody at the time of the questioning” – and defense counsel “submit[ted] to
the judge” regarding what to do in regard to the statements elicited from Mr. Vaughn during that

2

Though Dice discussed the implications of I.C.R. 12’s timing rules in a case similar to
Mr. Vaughn’s, the State does not cite Dice nor does it make any argument along the lines of the
Dice Court’s discussion of that issue. (See generally Resp. Br.) “A party waives an issue cited
on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking.” Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168 (2014)
(internal quotation omitted).
For context, Dice explained that the district court can only consider the merits of lateraised motions under I.C.R. 12 if the party raising the motion shows good cause or excusable
neglect for the delay. Dice, 126 Idaho at 597 (adding that the district court cannot excuse
I.C.R. 12’s timing requirements simply because the district court believes the motion is
meritorious). Since the district court in Mr. Vaughn’s case ruled on the merits of the Miranda
issue (Tr., p.98, Ls.5-22), it necessarily implicitly concluded that trial counsel’s explanation –
that his client had just made him aware of the Miranda issue and he had not had a chance to
review the issue in more detail – was sufficient to amount to good cause or excusable neglect,
and therefore, the lateness of the motion was not a reason to deny the motion outright. See, e.g.,
State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625-27 (1986) (considering the district court’s implicit
findings in regard to its analysis under I.C.R. 12); Middleton, 114 Idaho at 380 (Ct. App. 1988)
(same); see also State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 61 (2015) (reaffirming that there is a presumption
of regularity in the district court’s actions and judgments – that they are made consistent with the
applicable standards absent a showing to the contrary).
Since the State has made no argument that the district court’s implicit decision to reject
the prosecutor’s argument under I.C.R. 12 was incorrect, nor has it argued that this Court should
affirm the district court’s decision on the basis of I.C.R. 12, it has waived those issues on appeal.
See Murray, 156 Idaho at 168. As a result, this Court need not consider those issues.
4

time. (Tr., p.90, L.17 - p.91, L.10.) Alongside its arguments under I.C.R. 12, the prosecutor
addressed the merits of the Miranda issue, arguing that the facts showed that the defendant was
not handcuffed, that he was allowed to discuss various topics of his own choice, and so he had
volunteered the incriminating statements in that context. (See Tr., p.95, L.23 - p.97, L.6.) The
district court considered those arguments and expressly ruled on the merits of Mr. Vaughn’s
motion:
[B]ased upon what I’ve heard this morning, it appears to the court that there was
not a violation of Miranda regarding the information on the tapes at the scene.
From what I’ve heard, the defendant voluntarily disclosed those things when he
was not in custody or otherwise. The facts and circumstances there do not
disclose a Miranda violation. . . . The evidence, again, I think is admissible as
relevant as otherwise explained by the State. So it the exercise of discretion, the
court is not going to grant any Motion to Suppress or exclude that evidence.
(Tr., p.98, Ls.5-22.)
Since the specifics of the Miranda question were actually argued to the district court by
the parties, and the district court ruled on that issue, the propriety of that decision is properly
considered by this Court on appeal. Northcutt, 117 Idaho at 357; Dice, 126 Idaho at 598. In
other words, this issue is not, as the State believes, being raised “for the first time” on appeal.
Therefore, this Court should reject the State’s argument under Garcia-Rodriguez.

B.

A Reasonable Person In Mr. Vaughn’s Situation Would Not Have Felt Free To Leave
During The Roadside Detention, Which Means Mr. Vaughn Was “In Custody” For
Miranda Purposes At That Time
The State makes several arguments in relation to the merits of the Miranda issue, none of

which are persuasive. First, it contends that there was not a sufficient factual record upon which
to assess the legal question of custody under Miranda. (See Resp. Br., p.13.) That assertion
ignores the fact that both attorneys and the district court referred to the specific facts, which were
already established in the record and were not in dispute in regard to the Miranda issue.
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(See generally Tr., p.90, L.12 - p.99, L.20.) Specifically, those facts were set forth in the
testimony taken during the hearing on the prior motion to suppress and in the grand jury
proceedings, the transcript of which had been provided as an exhibit, and of which the district
court had taken judicial notice, at the hearing on the prior motion to suppress. (R., pp.55-70;
Tr., p.23, L.10 - p.24, L.17.) In fact, the prosecutor demonstrated this was the case, as she
provided a detailed recitation of the facts surrounding the roadside encounter while seeking to
demonstrate Mr. Vaughn’s disclosures at that time were voluntary. (Tr., p.95, L.23 - p.97, L.6.)
Most importantly, however, is the fact that the district court made factual determinations
based on what it heard during those arguments and from “the information on the tapes at the
scene,” of which it was also apparently taking judicial notice. 3 (Tr., p.98, Ls.6-8.) As the Court
of Appeals has made clear, “‘[a]ll presumptions favor the [trial court’s] exercise of [the power to
weigh the evidence and to draw factual inferences] . . . . [T]he trial court’s findings on such
matters, whether express or implied, must be upheld if they are supported by substantial
evidence.’” Middleton, 114 Idaho at 380 (quoting Kirkwood, 111 Idaho at 625) (all alterations
from Middleton). Therefore, the parties’ and district court’s discussion of the Miranda issue
reveals that there is, in fact, a sufficient factual record on which to resolve the legal question of
whether Mr. Vaughn was “in custody” during the roadside detention.
The State’s related assertion – that the “empirical questions” raised on appeal might have
been resolved in the district court had the motion been brought earlier (Resp. Br., p.16) – is also
mistaken.

All those so-called “empirical questions” explain why the district court’s legal

conclusion about whether Mr. Vaughn was in custody based on the facts of his case (which are

3

The district court appears to be referring to the videos from the officers’ body cameras during
the roadside detention, which were ultimately admitted as exhibits during the trial. (See State’s
Exhibits 25, 26, 27.)
6

still not in dispute) was mistaken. The question of custody is a question which the appellate
courts review de novo. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 115 (1995) (holding the
question of custody under Miranda is one of law); State v. Frank, 133 Idaho 364, 369 (Ct. App.
1999) (reiterating the standard of review for this issue). Thus, while the specific arguments in
support of a position may evolve on appeal, as they have here, that is not a reason for the
appellate courts to not consider the issue raised on appeal. Ada County Highway Dist. v. Brooke
View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, ___, 395 P.3d 357, 361 n.2 (2017) (“There is no question that ACHD
clearly raised the relevant issue before the district court. ACHD’s specific arguments in support
of its position may have evolved since the trial, but the issues on appeal and ACHD’s position
with respect to them remain the same,” and so, could be considered on appeal). Rather, just like
the Supreme Court in Northcutt, this Court has a sufficient factual record and sufficient briefing
about the associated legal question, and so, it can and should review the propriety of the district
court’s answer to that question of law. See Northcutt, 117 Idaho at 357.
Second, the State contends that, by not specifically reciting the Berkemer standard4 while
discussing the question of custody, Mr. Vaughn failed to present a prima facie claim under
Miranda. (Resp. Br., pp.13-14.) The Idaho Supreme Court has rejected similar arguments as
being “hollow” representations based on “selective and tortured” readings of the record.
Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Med. Investor, LLC, 157 Idaho 732, 740 (2014). In that
case, the Supreme Court rejected Quail Ridge’s argument that the district court erred in
dismissing a breach of contract claim because it did not use certain “magic words” in regard to
whether the dismissal was with prejudice and whether the claim was unripe when the record was
ultimately revealed the answer in both respects. Id. The State in this case would, like Quail

4

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984).
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Ridge, require certain “magic words” be used when arguing under Miranda even though the
pertinent part of the record reveals exactly what defense counsel was asking the district court to
conclude – that Mr. Vaughn “was in custody at the time of questioning.” (Tr., p.91, Ls.1-3.)
Therefore, the record is clear that trial counsel identified and argued the relevant legal question –
whether Mr. Vaughn was in custody given the facts of this case. As a result, this Court should,
like the Supreme Court in Pocatello Hosp., reject the State’s overly-formalistic argument
regarding how a party should argue a Miranda claim.
Third, even if the State’s argument – that the presence of the two police officers in the car
stopped a short distance from the stop and the presence of another undercover officer in the area
should not be considered in the totality of the circumstances – is correct, it does not change the
conclusion that Mr. Vaughn was “in custody” for Miranda purposes. (See Resp. Br., p.15.)
As an initial matter, however, the State’s argument fails to appreciate that a reasonable person in
Mr. Vaughn’s situation could have been aware of those other officers, which means their
presence is properly considered in the totality of the circumstances.
For example, the two officers who were overseeing the stop had parked their car on a rise
a short distance back from the stop specifically so that they could see the stop. (Grand Jury
Tr., p.22, Ls.3-5, p.24, L.18 - p.25, L.3; Tr., p.51, Ls.22-23.) If they could see the stop, a
reasonable person in Mr. Vaugh’s position could see them, especially since they had stopped
close enough to see what was going on without the aid of binoculars. (Grand Jury Tr., p.26,
Ls.2-4.) The fact that they were just sitting on the side of a busy interstate highway, where the
normal motoring public does not usually stop and sit idly, reinforces the fact that a reasonable
person in Mr. Vaughn’s position could have recognized the officers in that car for what they
were – part of a larger police force working to arrest him.
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Regardless, even if the State is correct and a reasonable person in Mr. Vaughn’s situation
would not have recognized the presence of the other nearby officers, the totality of the relevant
circumstances still includes the presence of the three uniformed officers who arrived almost
simultaneously in three different marked patrol cars to an alleged speeding stop, one of whom
brought and quickly deployed his drug dog before searching Mr. Vaughn’s car, all while one of
the other officers stood guard over Mr. Vaughn on the side of a busy freeway. A reasonable
person would still believe that, based on the totality of those circumstances, he was not free to
leave. Compare State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 610-11 (Ct. App. 1990).
The State’s suggestion that every traffic stop on a freeway will involve these same factors
(Resp. Br., p.16) is also mistaken. A good many traffic stops on a freeway will not involve
multiple officers, which means not every traffic stop on a freeway will result in the situation
here, where one officer stands guard over the driver while another searches the car. That is why
the number of officers involved in a stop, their behavior during that stop, and the location of the
stop are all relevant factors the courts should consider in such cases – they are all factors which
will vary from case to case. See Myers, 118 Idaho at 610-11. As a result, it is the presence of
those specific factors which results in Miranda applying in cases like this and Myers and not in
traditional traffic stops.
Ultimately though, whether custody exists in a particular case must be assessed based on
the specific facts of that case, not a different hypothetical case. See, e.g., State v. Young, 136
Idaho 711, 719 (Ct. App. 2002). To that point, if, as the State argument seems to suggest, each
of the factors involved in that determination is not sufficient to show custody on its own, they
still do when considered in totality. Compare State v. Kelley, 159 Idaho 417, 424 (Ct. App.
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2015) (explaining that, under a similar standard, factors which are not illegal on their own can
still give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when they are considered together).
As a result, however viewed, the totality of the circumstances in this case reveals that a
reasonable person in Mr. Vaughn’s situation would have not felt free to leave during the roadside
detention, and thus, Mr. Vaughn was “in custody” for Miranda purposes at that time. Therefore,
the district court erred by allowing the unwarned statements elicited from him during that time to
be admitted during his trial.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Vaughn respectfully requests this Court reverse the order admitting his unMirandized statements, vacate his conviction, and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 3rd day of April, 2018.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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